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Abstract
Australia introduced an incentive payment scheme for general practitioners to
ensure systematic and high quality care in chronic disease management. There is
little empirical evidence and ambiguous theoretical guidance on which effects to
expect on the quality of care. This paper evaluates the impact of the payment
incentives on quality of care in diabetes, as measured by the probability of ordering
an HbA1c test. The empirical analysis is conducted with a unique data set and a
multivariate probit model to control for the simultaneous self-selection process of
practices into the payment scheme and larger practices. The study finds that the
incentive reform had a positive effect on quality of care in diabetes management and
that participation in the scheme is facilitated by the support of Divisions of General
Practice.
1 INTRODUCTION
Pay-for-performance mechanisms for quality improvement are growing rapidly in the re-
muneration of health care providers and doctors in particular. Remuneration is usually
conditional on achieving pre-specified levels of activity, standards of care, or behaviours in
specific disease areas based on guidelines of best practice. These systems are often being
superimposed on existing remuneration schemes, creating more complex blended payment
systems that aim to re-orient the payment scheme away from structures and processes
towards health outcomes. Most of the implemented programs, however, are in the early
stages of trial, evaluation, and adjustment.
Australia introduced a pay-for-performance scheme for GP remuneration in chronic
disease management in 1999. The Practice Incentive Program (PIP), superimposed on
the existing fee-for-service payment system, includes capitation payments for practice
infrastructure and pay-for-performance to encourage higher quality of care in diabetes,
asthma, mental health and cervical screening. To date, there has been no systematic
assessment of the effects of the PIP reform on quality of care, and this lack of empirical
evidence is the point of departure for our paper.
We analyse the effects of the introduction of the Practice Incentive Program on the
quality of care provided for managing diabetes, a major chronic disease with clear and
evidence-based indicators of quality of care. In our study, quality of care is measured
by whether an HbA1c test was ordered during a consultation. We then compare the
average proportion of HbA1c tests ordered by GPs that have joined the incentive scheme
(treatment group) with the average proportion of tests ordered by GPs that have not
joined (control group), while controlling for key sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
Even though there is a growing literature on performance-based pay in health care
(Gaynor et al., 2001; Chalkley and Tilley, 2006; Lippi Bruni et al., 2007; Simoens and
Giuffrida, 2004; Shen et al., 2004; Rosenthal et al., 2005), it is difficult to predict the
possible effects of these financial incentives on the actual behaviour of GPs. Some argue
that in complex areas of service provision pay-for-performance should not be used, as
the potential to distort behaviour away from an organisation’s broader goals, which may
lead to unintended consequences, is high (Prendergast, 1999; Mooney and Ryan, 1993).
Payment incentives may crowd-out pre-existing intrinsic motivation and therefore lead to
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lower levels of performance (Frey and Jegen, 2001). Providers may have been performing
well in absence of the reform or providers may manipulate data or even submit fraudulent
claims to absorb rents from the incentive payments.
Empirical evidence on possibly the most elaborate pay-for -performance scheme, the
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QoF) in the UK (Roland, 2004), suggested a high
level of quality of care during the first year (Doran et al., 2006). However, Doran et al.
(2006) and Gravelle et al. (2008) report evidence of gaming and concerns that many GPs
were already meeting the standards of care in the QoF, implying the payment reform may
not have changed quality of care.
Our paper adds to the literature in several ways. First, a unique data-set is used
that includes detailed information on the content of GP consultations, and therefore,
actual clinical behaviour is observed rather than fee claims. Data is available for several
consultations conducted by one GP, and therefore theoretically, GP-specific heterogeneity
can be controlled for. Second, the endogenous nature of general practices’ participation
in the PIP and the empirically observed simultaneous growth trend of larger general
practices are handled by applying a trivariate probit model. We merge longitudinal data
on the activities and characteristics of each GP’s Regional Primary Organisation (Division
of General Practice) with our data-set. These data are used as exclusion restrictions to
identify the three simultaneous equations of HbA1c tests, PIP participation and practice
size. Whether the use of instruments is necessary to identify the effects of interest is
also examined. Wilde (2000) suggests that exclusion restrictions are not necessary under
certain conditions and thus we add to the debate of the appropriate specification of
multivariate probit models.
The main result of our paper is that the incentive reform had a positive effect on
quality of care in diabetes management. Practices located in Divisions which provided
support services were more likely to join the PIP scheme, and therefore, increase quality
of care. This effect, however, is only made observable through the appropriate choice of
exclusion restrictions and by controlling for the correlation of unobservable factors that
positively influence the probability of increasing quality of care and negatively influence
the probability of joining the incentive reform.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the institutional
design of the incentive payments. Section 3 presents the theoretical model that guides
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hypothesis formulation for the empirical tests. Section 4 outlines the empirical framework
and Section 5 describes the data used. In Section 6 we present a descriptive analysis of the
data and estimation results from the pooled and multivariate probits. Section 7 discusses
the results in light of the existing literature.
2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In Australia, the national universal insurance scheme, Medicare, is funded through general
taxation. Medical services, including GP and specialist services, are directly funded by
the federal government through uncapped fee-for-service.
GPs act as gatekeepers to specialist care. Medicare funding of GP services is based on
the Medicare Fee Schedule. GPs can charge patients what the market will bear - there are
no price controls. Patients can then claim a fixed rebate (the schedule fee) from Medicare,
thus facing a co-payment equal to the difference between the rebate and the price charged
by the GP. Alternatively, GPs can claim the schedule fee directly from Medicare and only
charge patients the co-payment. GPs can also ’bulk-bill’ and do not charge the patient
a co-payment and receive 100% of the rebate directly from Medicare as full payment.
The fee schedule for GPs is based on payment for each consultation provided, with the
fee rising across four different levels of complexity and consultation length. Fees range
between AUS $ 15 and AUS $ 91.70 in 2008. The fee structure provides incentives for a
high throughput of patients and shorter consultations, which in turn leads to higher costs
because of inappropriate prescribing and referral and a poor quality of care (Scott and
Shiell, 1997; Beilby, 2003). There is no patient registration and there are no restrictions
on where GPs may establish their practice, except for doctors emigrating to Australia.
In addition to the Medicare system of fee-for-service reimbursement, blended payments
for GPs were introduced in 1999 through the Practice Incentive Program (PIP). In 2003
this program contributed to almost 10% of GPs’ income (Harris et al., 2004). The aim was
to move away from the fee-for-service model towards a system of remuneration linked to
the provision of quality of care rather than volume. Practices joining the PIP scheme were
required to be accredited from 1 January 2001. Practices that participated in the PIP
scheme before that date were required to be fully accredited by 1 January 2002. Practices
that participated in the PIP scheme for the first time from 1 January 2001 onwards, must
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have been registered for accreditation by the date of joining and needed to be accredited
within 12 months of joining. The accreditation process involves both administrative and
financial burden. GP practices have to pay a fixed fee to accreditation agencies and comply
with a range of organisational restructuring requirements. Accreditation takes place on
the basis of the standards of the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners and is
conducted by two independent not-for-profit organisations which were established in 1997
and 1999. Once accredited, the status is valid for three years.
PIP practices can receive capitation payments for achieving a minimum level of prac-
tice infrastructure including payments for having IT infrastructure, being a teaching prac-
tice, and providing after hours care. They can also receive capitation sign-on payments
for asthma, diabetes, mental health and cervical screening in exchange for maintaining
disease registers so practices can provide follow-up care. General practices in remote ar-
eas receive an additional loading of 15% to 50% of the total PIP remuneration depending
on the geographical size of the region of the practice location and the remoteness of the
practice.
From November 2001, PIP practices who were signed on for the chronic disease pay-
ments were also eligible to claim Service Incentive Payments (SIPs) in the areas of asthma,
diabetes, mental health and cervical screening. This is an additional fee for the completion
of a defined annual cycle of care (a sequence of visits) based on evidence-based clinical
guidelines. The first pay-out of SIPs for eligible practitioners were made in February 2002
for the completion of a cycle of care that was recorded from 1 November 2001 onwards.
In May 2003, Outcome Payments (OPs) were also introduced that provided additional
remuneration for completing a cycle of care for a certain percentage of the population in
each disease area.
The incentives in the PIP made it financially worthwhile for some practices to be-
come accredited, and it is worth noting that at the time the PIP and accreditation were
introduced, the proportion of solo general practices in Australia began to fall markedly.
The fixed set up and administrative costs of accreditation, joining the PIP scheme, and
claiming SIP and OP could more easily be borne by larger general practices, and this may
have encouraged practices to become larger in order to benefit from economies of scale
and scope. The decision to become accredited, join the PIP, and increase practice size
were likely to have been made simultaneously for many general practices.
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In addition, general practices were being encouraged and supported to join the PIP
scheme and become accredited by their local Divisions of General Practice. Divisions pro-
vided information, resources and advice to local practices about accreditation, joining the
PIP scheme and claiming SIPs. Divisions are geographically based primary care organi-
sations, established in 1992. There are currently 115 across Australia with a membership
of close to 98 % of all GPs (Hordacre et al., 2006). A key change since the late 1990s is
the use of Divisions by the Federal government and other agencies to deliver funding for
specific health care services and schemes (Australian Division of General Practice, 2005).
For diabetes, the sign-on capitation payment is paid to practices who have a register
of diabetes patients and a recall system. In 2008, this is AUS $ 1 per patient, about AUS
$ 1,000 for the average GP. These capitation payments were introduced in August 1999.
The SIP is paid on completion of an annual cycle of care and can be claimed only at
the last encounter of the cycle. In 2008, this payment was AUS $ 40 per completed cycle
of care.
Claims for the OP can be made only by practices where 20 % of diabetes patients have
completed an annual cycle of care and at least a minimum of 2 % of all their patients are
patients with diabetes. For diabetes, this payment is AUS $ 20 per patient in 2008.
To claim a cycle of care, a GP needs to perform the following services for a diabetes
patient (Diabetes Australia, 2007, p. 28):
• 6 monthly: measurement of height, weight and BMI, blood pressure and foot exam-
ination.
• 12 monthly: order an HbA1c test (also called glyctest), a lipid profile test, and a
urine microalbumin test.
• 24 monthly: ensure one eye-examination.
• All Diabetes 2 patients must initially see an ophthalmologist or optometrist (and
then every two years).
• Educate patient on diet and diabetes.
• Offer assistance with smoking cessation.
• Review medication.
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• Referral to a diabetes educator (initially).
• Referral to podiatrist’s help if neuropathy, peripheral vascular disease, foot abnor-
mality or calluses was diagnosed.
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We examine the effect of PIP on quality of care in diabetes. The incentives in the PIP for
increasing quality of care include the combined effects of capitation payments, a Service
Incentive Payment (SIP) and an Outcomes Payment (OP). The evaluation problem we
face is due to the voluntary nature of participating in the PIP scheme and the possibility
that, even if a practice joined the scheme, a GP within that practice may not increase
quality of care. In this respect, two decisions have to be modelled: (i) the decision of the
practice to join the PIP scheme; and (ii) the decision of an individual GP to provide and
finish a cycle of care and, therefore, to increase quality of care.
A general practice g will join the PIP if the utility derived from joining is strictly
greater than the utility from not joining: UPIPg > UNOPIPg . The utility from joining is1:
UPIPg = U
[
H (nc (mg, eg)) , Y
(
(pmg + ngp
CAP + nc (mg, eg) p
SIP
+pT
(
nc (mg, eg)
ng
, t
)
+ Yr
)− C(mg, γSIP eg, FPIP )] , (1)
and the utility from not joining the PIP is:
UNOPIPg = U [H (n
c (mg, eg)) , Y (pmg)− C(mg, eg, 0)] (2)
The general practice’s utility is assumed to be a function of the health gains (H) of each
patient who obtains quality care (nc), and income Y (.) net of costs C(.).
Independent of joining the PIP, income for practices depends on the number of con-
sultations (m) conducted and the total price charged to each patient for each consultation
(p)2. Income for practices participating in the PIP scheme is supplemented by capitation
payments (pCAP ) per patient (n), by SIPs (pSIP ) that depend on the number of completed
1The notation is defined in Table I.
2This price includes the Medicare fee rebate that is fixed for all consultations and the patient co-
payment which is variable.
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cycles of care (nc), and OPs (pT ) if the number of patients receiving a completed cycle of
care reaches a target percentage of all eligible patients. In simple terms, a PIP practice
can increase its average revenue per consultation if it joins the PIP and if its GPs are
able to claim SIPs and OPs. Rural practices receive extra revenues Yr due to the rural
loading.
Table I. Notation
Variable Definition
n Diabetes patients
nc Cycles of care associated with quality of care
m Consultations
e GPs effort in producing cycles of care
H Health of patients
Y Doctor’s/practice’s income
C Doctor’s/practice’s costs
p Medicare FFS payment
pCAP PIP capitation payment
pT PIP outcome target payment
pSIP SIP payment
F PIP Fixed cost of joining PIP scheme
i Subscripts GPs
g Subscripts general practice
Yr Rural loading
γSIP Extra effort required for GPs to claim SIPs
Independent of the PIP status, the practice’s cost function depends on effort (e) and
the number of consultations (m). Practice costs are higher in the PIP scheme since joining
PIP incurs fixed financial and administrative costs (FPIP ) related to accreditation. For
large practices the cost per employed GP is smaller, since the capitation payment is based
on the number of patients seen, but the accreditation cost is independent of practice size.
On the other hand, practices who claim SIP need to make an extra effort in improving
quality and in ensuring that their patients attend scheduled consultations for completion
of the cycle. We introduce an extra parameter γSIP > 1 in the cost function to represent
the extra effort.
GPs also derive utility directly from their patients’ health status (H). What the
literature now calls ’intrinsic motivation’ (see Francois and Vlassopoulus (2007) for a
survey) may be the main driver for providing quality-enhancing care.
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Linking the direct arguments of the practice utility function through mg and nc we
assume patient health is an increasing function of the number of cycles of care, which is
in turn an increasing function of the number of patients and effort, H (nc(mg, eg)). Effort
and consultations link cycles of care to the cost function.
A general practice decides to join the PIP scheme, if for optimal values ofmg and eg the
marginal benefit, through patient health and revenue is greater than the marginal cost, in
terms of the utility cost of effort and the monetary cost of participation and consultations.
Practices not joining the PIP have no monetary incentive for quality-enhancing effort, only
an incentive via the patient’s health.
We can see from (1) that practices will be more likely to join the PIP the higher are
any of the PIP payments (pCAP , pSIP , pT ), the lower is the target threshold t and the less
costly it is to produce cycles of care (nc(.)). Equally, practices will be less likely to join
PIP, the higher is the fixed cost F PIP and the extra effort γSIP .
The second decision concerns GPs within practices who have joined the PIP to com-
plete the quality-enhancing cycles of care in diabetes. In our setting, finishing a cycle of
care and claiming the SIP is analogous to improving quality of care. An individual GP
i chooses to increase quality of care if USIPCLAIMi > UNOSIPCLAIMi , whereby the utility
from GP increasing quality is defined as:
USipclaimi = U
[
H (nc (mi, ei)) , Y
(
pmi + ngp
CAP + nc (mi, ei) p
SIP
+pT
(
nc (mi, ei)
ng
, t
))
− C(mi, γSIP ei)
]
, (3)
and the utility derived from not claiming SIP is defined as:
UNosipclaimi = U
[
H (nc (mi, ei)) , Y
(
pmi + ngp
CAP
+pT
(∑
i n
c (mi, ei)
ng
, t
))
− C(mi, ei)
]
. (4)
The SIP payment pSIP and Medicare reimbursement p are paid to individual GPs based
on their cycles of care (SIPs) and consultations. Strictly speaking, the capitation ngpCAP
and the target payment is shared between GPs of the same practice and, thus, should
be divided by the number of GPs in the practice. For simplicity, we abstract from the
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income sharing rule3.
In a reduced form representation, the optimal number of completed cycles of care nc∗
can be expressed as:
nc∗ = nc∗(p, pCAP , pSIP , pT , γSIP , FPIP ). (5)
It is a function of the price paid for each consultation by Medicare (p), of the prices for
the capitation payment (pCAP ), for the SIP claim (pSIP ), and for the target payment (pT ),
of the quality enhancing parameter (γSIP ) and of the fixed cost to join the PIP (FPIP ).
The functional form of Eq. (5) depends on the functional form of the utility function, of
the health production function, and of the revenue and cost functions in the PIP and SIP
claiming equations.
In sum, the optimal level of quality of care depends on whether a practice joins the
PIP. PIP can increase or decrease practice revenue depending on size of associated costs,
and these in turn depend negatively on the parameter γSIP and the fixed costs F PIP , and
positively on the revenues pCAP , pSIP pT . Some practices may choose to join while others
won’t. Practices that manage to decrease quality-enhancing effort γSIP are more likely
to increase quality of care and claim SIP. This could happen, for instance, through the
activities of Divisions of General Practice.
4 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
In a first step, we estimate the individual GP’s decision to provide a cycle of care following
Eq. (5). Let’s assume the general practitioner i derives utility from increasing the quality
of care in consultation j, but this latent utility Y ∗ij is unobserved:
Y ∗ij = α + β1PIPi + γ
′Xi + γ′Xj + δ′Tt + uij (6)
We observe, however, a discrete proxy with Yij = 1 if the difference in utility from
increasing quality of care, compared to not increasing quality of care, is positive (Y ∗ij > 0),
and Yij = 0 otherwise. The discrete indicator used is whether the GP has ordered an
3In the case of a shared income rule for the Outcome Payment (OP), individual GPs would have an
incentive to free-ride on the work of other GPs. Such a scenario is one explanation for a lower up-take of
SIP claiming.
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HbA1c test for diabetes. PIPi is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the GP works
in a practice which has joined the PIP, and 0 otherwise. The parameter β1 measures
the direction and size of the effect of PIP on quality of care provided compared to GPs
working in practices who are not in the PIP scheme. The row vector Xi contains a set
of observed GP and practice characteristics that vary across GPs. The row vector Xj
contains variables measuring the characteristics of the patient at the encounter. Tt is a
vector of dummy variables for each year capturing the time trend in quality of care. All
other unobservable factors are relegated to the error term uij. Assuming the error term
to be normally distributed uij ∼ N(0, 1) yields the probability of ordering an HbA1c test:
Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(α+ β1PIPi + γ
′Xi + γ′Xj + δ′Tt), (7)
where Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Parameter esti-
mates are obtained by Maximum Likelihood.
The treatment indicator PIPi cannot be assumed to be exogenous, since joining the
PIP scheme depends on the decision of the general practice in which the GP works,
which may also be strongly correlated with the decision to provide quality of care by the
individual GP.
Selection into treatment depends on the GP’s preference for different practice styles,
special interests in the specific disease or differences in the amount and quality of knowl-
edge held by each GP. Some of these may be partly captured by the GP’s experience,
age and gender. There may also be unobserved differences in practice cost structures,
e.g. practice size, that influence the decision to join the PIP, but that also influence the
probability of treating diabetes patients. Estimates of β1 and other parameters are likely
to be biased in Eq. (6).
We address this identification problem with a system of equations estimated with a
multivariate probit model4. The method accounts for correlations between unobservables.
4We could also exploit the panel structure of the data (multiple consultations per GP) to control
for unobservable GP-invariant effects. Random effects models assuming a linear correlation between
the unobserved and time-varying observed variables proposed by Mundlak (1978) cannot be used in
this setting. The data we use for the empirical analysis provides time-varying data only for patient
characteristics. We assume, however, that unobservable factors influencing both the decision to join the
PIP scheme and to provide quality of care are related to practice characteristics. We have tested random
effects models, but results do not differ substantially from a pooled version. Fixed effects models can also
not be exploited, because we have no variation in the treatment effect within observations.
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Instead of relying on mere functional form assumptions, exclusion restrictions should be
used to improve the identification of each simultaneous equation (Maddala, 1983; Mon-
fardini and Radice, 2008). There are three endogenous decisions that are relevant, all of
which are likely to have a common set of unobserved factors leading to correlation amongst
the error terms. These are the decisions to: provide quality of care in consultations (Eq.
(8)), to join the PIP (Eq. (9)), and to be in a larger practice (Eq. (10)).
Y ∗ij = α1 + β
′
1X1ij + βPIPPIPij + βSSij + u1ij, (8)
PIP ∗ij = α2 + β
′
2X2ij + pi
′I2ij + u2ij, (9)
S∗ij = α3 + β
′
3X3ij + pi
′I3ij + u3ij. (10)
We allow X1ij = X2ij = X3ij, so that each equation includes the same set of control
variables. The row vectors I2ij and I3ij capture the instruments used. The error terms
urij, for r ∈ {1, 2, 3} are assumed to be distributed as multivariate normal, each with a
mean of zero, and variance-covariance matrix V, where V has values of 1 on the leading
diagonal and correlations ρrk = ρkr as off-diagonal elements. The log-likelihood function
for a sample of N independent observations:
L =
∑
i
wi log Φ3(µi; Ω), (11)
in which wi is an optional weight, Φ3(µi; Ω) is a standard trivariate normal cdf, µi =
(Ki1β
′
1X1ij, Ki2β
′
2X2ij, Ki3β
′
3X3ij) with Ki1 = 2Yij, and so on. The log-likelihood function
depends on the trivariate standard normal distribution function Φ3(.) and it is evaluated
using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) smooth recursive conditioning simulator.
This exploits the fact that a multivariate normal distribution function can be expressed
as the product of sequentially conditioned univariate normal distribution functions, which
can be easily and accurately evaluated.
According to Wilde (2000), exclusion restrictions for each equation are not needed, if
there is at least one exogenous regressor in each equation and if there is sufficient variation
in the data. Similar to Balia and Jones (2008) and Schneider and Schneider (2006), we
test this hypothesis by re-estimating the three equations without instruments.
Whether or not the instrumental variables are strong and valid are tested with the
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help of a Wald test suggested in Rashad and Kaestner (2004, p. 497). The validity of the
instruments can only be tested in an over-identified system of equations. The idea is to
test a just-identified trivariate model, by including one instrumental variable into the PIP
status (GP size) equation and include all the remaining instrumental variables into the
HbA1c test equation. Then we test the null hypothesis that all remaining instrumental
variables in the HbA1c test equation are jointly statistically insignificant.
Exogeneity of PIPij and Sij in Eq. (8) can be tested with a t- or a likelihood ratio
test on the statistical significance of the correlation coefficient ρ.
H0 : ρ21 = 0 & H0 : ρ32 = 0
H1 : ρ21 6= 0 & H1 : ρ32 6= 0.
However, a failure to reject H0 should be interpreted with caution. Monfardini and Radice
(2008) have shown in a Monte Carlo simulation that tests of ρ tend to display high over-
rejection patterns, and in certain cases over-rejection remains serious even in larger sample
sizes. The same study has also shown that, even though under correct distributional
assumptions, the lack of availability of a valid instrument will make inference on the degree
of exogeneity based on the correlation coefficient unreliable and, under misspecified error
terms, the model is performing poorly.
5 DATA
For the empirical analysis we use data from the Bettering the Evaluation and Care of
Health (BEACH) study conducted by the Family Medicine Research Centre of the Uni-
versity of Sydney in collaboration with the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
(Britt et al., 2005). Each year since 1998/99, data on 100 consecutive GP encounters
from a random sample of 1,000 GPs has been collected. Each encounter contains data
on up to four problems treated, and for each problem includes data on drugs prescribed,
treatments conducted, referrals written, and pathology and imaging ordered. In addi-
tion, a variety of information is provided about the patient, and the GP’s and practice’s
characteristics.
Since this paper is focussed on diabetes, we use a sub-set of data where at least one of
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the four problems managed is diabetes. The following variables available in the data-set
are used to control for patient, practice, GP and encounter characteristics:
1. Patient characteristics: age, gender, non-English speaking background, Aboriginal
or Torres Strait islander (ATSI), concession card status, and whether the patient
has type I or type II diabetes;
2. Encounter characteristics: up to four problems managed at the encounter (proxy
for co-morbidities), whether the problem is new, and year of encounter;
3. GP characteristics: age (age group 45 years and younger, 46 to 59 years, 60 years and
older), gender, number of sessions worked per week (proxy for full- and part-time
employment), and country of graduation;
4. Practice characteristics: number of GPs in the practice (solo GP, 2 to 4 GPs, 5 and
more GPs (the latter being used as indicator of a large practice)), computer use,
whether accredited, practice postcode, practice SEIFA5 (proxy for socio-economic
disadvantage), the geographic remoteness (city, inner region, outer region)6, and the
state in which the practice is located.
In addition, we linked the practice information with information on the Division of General
Practice which the practice belongs to using the practice postcode. This enables us to
obtain data on the activities and small area characteristics of each Division from the
Annual Survey of Divisions of General Practice (Hordacre et al., 2006). Variables include
Division activities and characteristics.
There are a number of tasks in the guidelines that indicate higher quality of care
in diabetes. Although one could use treatment intensity as a dependent variable (i.e.
the total number of guideline-recommended tasks) this may not in itself be indicative of
quality of care, as a well controlled diabetic receiving high quality care should require
fewer tests and investigations.
5SEIFA stands for Socio-Economic Index for Areas and is based on the postcode of the practice.
6Remoteness is a measure with discrete indicators, categorized on the basis of the index ARIA. ARIA
is a continuous measure scaled between 0 and 12 that calculates remoteness as accessibility to service
centres based on road distances. The location of the practice is available in five broad categories (1)
Major cities; (2) Inner regional areas; (3) Outer regional areas ; (4) Remote areas: (5) Very remote areas.
Since we have only a small number of practices located in the remote and very remote areas, we bundle
them under outer regional areas.
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The main indicator of quality used in the analysis is whether a glycated haemoglobin
(HbA1c, HbA1, fructosamine) blood test, which is often abbreviated by glyctest, was
conducted during the consultation. Guidelines state that it should be measured at least
once every 12 months (Diabetes Australia, 2007). Blood glucose monitoring enables ap-
propriate lifestyle and medication adjustment and monitors long term glycaemic control.
The United Kingdom Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) showed reduced incidence
and progression of diabetes related complications in subjects with a low HbAlc (UKPDS
33, 1998).
Whether a GP works in a PIP practice is measured using data on accreditation status
of the practice and the practice’s use of information technology (IT). Such a definition
is based on the assumption that all practices who are accredited join the PIP scheme,
and furthermore that the use of IT is required to register and recall diabetic patients
and claim the diabetes sign-on payment. These practices are also therefore eligible to
claim the SIP and OP. Although practices could become accredited from 1998, a question
on accreditation was only included in the BEACH GP questionnaire from 2001 onwards,
after the PIP scheme was introduced. Our data allow us to compare only the activities of
the treatment group with the activities of a ‘contemporaneous’ control group (practices
who were not accredited and didn’t use IT at the same point in time).
The activities and characteristics of the Division are used as instrumental variables
for identifying the equations in the trivariate probit model. Previous evidence using
Division-level panel data has shown that Divisions’ activities supported GPs in improving
the quality of care in diabetes, through education and information, but they have not
influenced SIP claims for diabetes. However, Divisions have had an impact on practice
infrastructure and so may have influenced the decisions of practices to become accredited,
join the PIP, and also increase the average size of practices (Scott and Coote, 2007). Thus,
the activities and characteristics of Divisions are unlikely to be correlated with the error
term in the HbA1c equation, but are likely to be partially correlated with PIP status and
practice size.
The set of instrumental variables used for identifying the PIP status equation are
the number of staff employed by the Division per practice, indicator variables that reflect
whether the Division is active in asthma programs, number of SIP services provided for
cervical screening, and the number of practicing GPs. All of these measures refer to data
14
at the Division level.
The number of staff employed by the Division per practice reflects the potential ad-
ministrative support which a Division can provide to practices to become accredited, to
join the PIP scheme, and to claim SIP services. The number of staff will not have any
independent influence on the clinical decision-making of a GP, as they are not involved in
the actual encounter. Whether the Division is active in Asthma programs, where asthma
is one of the four disease areas managed under the PIP scheme, reflects the fact that
Divisions active in one area of disease management are likely to be active in another area
of disease management (e.g diabetes). Although a Division, which is active in diabetes
management, may influence indirectly the number of HbA1c tests undertaken by GPs
(through a recall/reminder system based on the diabetes patient register system man-
aged at the Division level), activity in asthma cannot have any effect on clinical decision
making of the practice in diabetes. The number of SIP services provided for cervical
screening indicates peer-effects within the Division. The number of SIP services provided
in any other disease area should be highly correlated with the number of SIP services
provided in diabetes. The more practices are active in the PIP scheme, the more likely it
is that other practices get involved too, as word-to-mouth information about the benefits
of the program may circulate. How many SIP services are being claimed, however, will
have no influence on the proportion of HbA1c tests, as the disease areas are independent
of each other. Last, the number of practicing GPs within the Division’s catchment will
have an influence on the number of medical services provided, which ultimately has an
influence on the competition among practices within the Division. Competition among
practices will have an influence on practice organisation and practice size, but is unlikely
to influence independently the proportion of HbA1c tests conducted during the encounter.
The set of instrumental variables used for identifying the large practice size equation
are the proportion of female GPs, the proportion of solo practices, and the number of
practicing GPs, which are all measured at the Division level. Practice organisation and
style manifest themselves in the number of female GPs employed by the practice. Whereas
the gender of the GP may have an influence also on the probability of ordering an HbA1c
test (gender-specific difference in treatment styles), the proportion of female GPs active
in the Division should not influence the decision to order an HbA1c test, once the gender
of the GP has been controlled for. A similar argument holds for the proportion of solo
15
practices within the Division. Last, for reasons mentioned above, the number of practicing
GPs within the Division should have an effect on the practice size, as the degree of
competition within a Division should have an influence on practice organisation but not
on clinical decision-making.
6 RESULTS
Descriptive analysis
In total, we use a sample from 2000/2001 to 2006/2007 of around 13,000 GP-encounter
observations, in which diabetes was one of the four problems managed during the en-
counter. In about 21 % of consultations of our sample an HbA1c test has been ordered.
About 27 % of the sample belong to the treatment group, i.e. those practices identified to
participate in the PIP scheme. Summary statistics of all control variables used is provided
in Table III in the Appendix.
Trends in the proportion of encounters in which an HbA1c test was ordered are illus-
trated in Fig. 1. We compare the changes for practices that belong to the treatment group
after the Service Incentive Payment (SIP) had been introduced (PIP 2001-06 ), those that
did not join the PIP scheme after SIP had been introduced (No PIP 2001-06 ), and all
practices before the SIP component was introduced (All 1998-01 ). Crucial reform dates
are indicated by light gray, vertical solid lines in the year 1999 (August), when the PIP
scheme and capitation payments were introduced, in the year 2001 (November), when the
SIP was introduced, and in the year 2003 (May), when the Outcome Payment (OP) was
introduced.
There is an increasing trend in the proportion of HbA1c tests ordered since 1998,
both before the PIP scheme was introduced in 1999 and afterwards. For both control
and treatment group, this trend is continued after 2001, but it is slightly stronger for the
treatment group (thick, dashed line) after 2003 than for the control group (thin, dotted
line)7.
7The jump in average values in 2001 is due to the fact that in this year we have observations for the
group All 1998-2001 (until 31 October) and for both the treatment and control group (from 1 November
onwards).
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Figure 2. Proportion of large practices (≥ 5 GPs)
A similar growth trend can be observed for the proportion of large practices in the
sample since 2000. A practice is considered large if it employs five or more GPs. The
average growth trend is mainly driven by practices that have joined the PIP program. In
fact, the proportion of large practices among the control group has declined steadily since
2002. Fig. 2 illustrates these trends.
Fig. 3 compares the growth trends of the proportion of large practices, HbA1c tests,
and practices that have joined the PIP scheme. It is evident that all three variables show
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a significant increase over the years. The increase in the uptake of the PIP scheme is
steepest: almost 60 % of general practitioners belong to the treatment group in the final
year of our sample. This graph illustrates well the possibility that growth trends of the
three factors may be determined jointly.
Estimation results
Table II reports the coefficients and marginal effects of joining the PIP scheme on the
probability of ordering an HbA1c test. All models control for the same set of independent
variables. Model (1) assumes no self-selection into treatment. The effect is not significant,
both economically and statistically8. Full results are reported in Table IV in the Appendix.
In contrast, the trivariate probit model yields a statistically significant treatment effect
(PIP 2001-2006 ) at a 1 % level. In terms of magnitude, the marginal effect is 15 %,
suggesting that a GP working in a practice that joined the PIP program is 15 % more
likely to order a test than a comparable GP in a practice that has not joined.
Estimation results are obtained using 200 draws to simulate the log-likelihood func-
tion9. Theoretical results suggest to use at least the square root of the number of observa-
8We have tested for the possibility that the treatment effect is conditional on the timing, the practice
size or the remoteness of the practice. None of the three hypotheses, however, can be confirmed. The
treatment effect is statistically insignificant for all outlined interaction effects.
9The default is 5 draws in the STATA program mvprobit written by Lorenzo Cappellari and Stephen
Jenkins. The authors point out that it is the responsibility of the researcher to choose the correct number
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Table II. Results Pooled and trivariate probit
Pooled Trivariate probit
probit PIP status HbA1c test GP size
Treatment: coefficient
PIP 2001-2006 0.023 0.515
(0.033) (0.166)***
Treatment: marginal effect
PIP 2001-2006 0.007 0.151
(0.010) (0.049)***
Instruments used in PIP status eq.
Division active in asthma program 0.252
(0.155)
Num of staff in Division per practice 0.572
(0.245)**
Number of SIP services (cerv screen) 0.002
(0.001)***
Instruments used in GP size eq.
Proportion of solo GPs in Division -0.852
(0.264)***
Proportion of female GPs in Division 0.713
(0.398)*
Instrument used in PIP status & GP size eq.
Number of GPs active in Division -0.004 -0.001
(0.001)*** (0.001)***
Correlation of unobservables between equation
ρ21 -0.258
(0.109)**
ρ31 -0.550
(0.170)***
ρ32 -0.032
(0.135)
The marginal effect for the treatment effect is computed with the mvpred command and the delta method.
All equations include the same set of control variables as used in the full pooled probit specification. * 10
%, ** 5 %, *** 1 % significance level.
tions as the number of draws, which would be in our case at least 110 draws. Cappellari
and Jenkins (2006) mention that the coefficients and/or their standard errors will ul-
timately change with the number of draws (and therefore, as we believe, the marginal
effects).
Self-selection occurs in the sense that practices which are located in a Division that
delivers an asthma program and whose number of staff per practice is large are more likely
to join the PIP scheme. This latter observation suggests that it is the work and effort of
the Division staff in supporting practices to SIP claim that influences the practice decision
to join the PIP scheme, rather than pure capacity constraint arguments.
In addition, practices are also more likely to joint the PIP scheme in a Division in
which the number of SIP services provided in cervical screening are high. This suggests
that practices are more likely to join the scheme if its application is more prevalent and
of draws. Under standard conditions, the MSL estimator is consistent as the number of observations and
the number of draws tend to infinity and is asymptotically equivalent to the true maximum likelihood
estimator as the ratio of the square root of the sample size to the number of draws tends to zero. Thus,
other things equal, the more draws, the better.
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perceived as effective, as positive information about the nature of the scheme influences
expected costs and benefits. Practices are also less likely to join the PIP if the number of
practitioners active in the Division is large.
The instruments used in the PIP status equation are tested to be both valid and
strong. All possible permutations of testing for the validity of the instruments with the
help of a Wald test indicate that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that three of the
four instruments are jointly insignificant in the HbA1c test equation, while leaving the
remaining instrument in the PIP status equation10.
Larger practices (5 and more GPs employed) are more likely to be located in Divisions
in which the total number of active GPs and the proportion of solo GPs are low. They
are more likely to be located in Divisions in which the proportion of female GPs is high.
All instruments have no independent statistically significant influence on the probability
to order an HbA1c test11. These results are summarised in Table V in the Appendix.
The error terms are negatively correlated between the PIP status and the HbA1c equa-
tion and between the PIP status and the GP size equation. Both correlation coefficients
are statistical significant at the 5 % and 1 % level, rejecting the hypothesis of exogeneity
of the two variables PIP status and GP size in the HbA1c test equation12. The negative
correlation suggests that unobservables which are negatively influencing the probability of
joining the PIP scheme are positively influencing the probability of conducting the HbA1c
test, and thus, increasing quality of care.
The unobservables influencing the probability of a large practice size and the proba-
bility to order an HbA1c test are not correlated. The treatment effect, resulting from a
bivariate probit specification that accounts only for the correlation of unobservables be-
tween the PIP status and the HbA1c test equation and which uses the exact log-likelihood,
is 20 % and statistically significant at the 1 % level (results omitted).
Another intriguing result from our analysis is that once we drop the instruments
from the trivariate (bivariate) probit, an approach suggested by Wilde (2000), we find no
statistically significant effect of the PIP reform on quality of care. The magnitude of the
10For all possible permutations the p-value lies between 0.330 or 0.808.
11For all possible permutations the p-value lies between 0.542 and 0.642.
12Statistical significance of the correlation in the trivariate probit model depends on the choice of the
instruments chosen. In a bivariate probit model however the correlation of unobserved factors of the PIP
status and the HbA1c equation is highly statistically significant and independent of the choice of the
instruments.
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marginal effect (standard error) is .098 (.069) and the p-value = 0.156. In addition, the
correlation between the error-term of all three (two) equations is small and statistically
insignificant (all p-values are greater than 0.200). One explanation could be that our
data does not provide enough variation to identify the equations exclusively on the basis
of functional form assumptions.
7 DISCUSSION
Pay-for-performance is being increasingly used to change clinical behaviour. The study
finds that the incentive reform had a positive effect on quality of care in diabetes man-
agement. The magnitude of the effect lies between a 15 % and 20 % difference in the
probability of ordering an HbA1c test since the reform was introduced.
Practices self-selected into the treatment due to the fact that not all practices faced
the same conditions of joining in and claiming. The activities of the Divisions of General
Practice played a major role in the uptake and therefore on the effects of the reform on
quality of care.
The strong influence of Divisions’ activities highlights the importance of a supporting
regional infrastructure when a complex payment system is introduced to remunerate GPs.
This confirms other evidence of the effect of Divisions on diabetes care provided by GPs.
For example, before the introduction of the new incentive payment, some Divisions of
General Practice had already established programs with some elements of systematic care,
including Division-based registers, recall systems and GP feedback (Harris et al., 2002).
Practices that were linked to these shared-care diabetes registers reviewed patients more
often and were generally more likely to conduct tests recommended in the evidence-based
guidelines than GPs not using registers (DeDomenico et al., 2005).
Difficulties in uptake have been discussed in the general literature on the implemen-
tation of highly complex payment systems (Robinson et al., 2004). For the PIP, apart
from an initial enthusiastic uptake when the PIP scheme was introduced, the response has
levelled off in later years (Harris et al., 2004). Proudfoot et al. (2007) found that the im-
plementation of the new payment systems for chronic disease management was perceived
as the most difficult task out of all tasks faced by GPs. In the case of claiming services
that completed a cycle of care, for instance, it was mainly the extent of administrative
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burden that posed problems. This included the lack of support staff that would be needed
to make the claim which is more problematic for solo and/or rural practices that cannot
hire extra staff (DeDomenico et al., 2005). Furthermore, some GPs, even though they
provided the service, did not claim it or they claimed it via another care plan. Many GPs
seem to be not aware of which services they can claim. A government review of ’red tape’
in 2004 led to a number of changes in PIP (and other schemes) from 2005/6 that made it
less costly for GPs to claim a range of fees.
In addition to a lack of organisational capacity in some practices, the level of remu-
neration may not have been sufficient to encourage more practices to join the PIP and
become accredited, and once in the PIP, the incentive payments may have been too low.
At around 10% of total GP income, this may have been insufficient for some practices,
especially if they could increase earnings in other less costly ways.
There are a number of issues about the modelling that are important to emphasise.
Since our data were not a panel nor was it possible to observe treatment status before the
reform, this study could not directly examine changes in the behaviour of the same GPs
over time in a difference-in-difference framework. Our implicit comparisons of different
GPs in each year rely on the fact that each cross-section is a random sample of all GPs.
More importantly, the trivariate probit model allowed us to control for the correlation of
unobservable factors between the decision to join the PIP, the decision to undertake an
HbA1c test, and the decision to be a large practice. One can speculate on what these
unobserved factors might be, such as intrinsic motivation or unobserved marginal costs,
but this can only be confirmed by more detailed data which does not yet exist. The model
also allowed identification of the effect of PIP on the probability of ordering an HbA1c
test through the use of strong and valid instrumental variables.
Due to sample size considerations, it was not possible to examine the effect of PIP
over time. Usually one expects an initial strong effect and then a levelling off of the effect
of the incentive. The marginal effect reported here is therefore an average between 2001/2
and 2006.
The results imply that the PIP is having a moderate effect on quality of care in diabetes
and should therefore be continued as long as policy makers believe that these additional
benefits are worth the costs of the scheme. Further research is evaluating the effects of
the PIP on other incentivised areas of care (asthma, mental health and cervical screening)
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which would give a more complete picture of the benefits of the scheme.
A Appendix
Table III. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PIP 2001-06 0.271 0.445 0 1 24172
Practice accredited 0.676 0.468 0 1 21248
Full computer use at practice 0.319 0.466 0 1 24172
Percentage of HbA1c tests 0.208 0.406 0 1 24161
Age of GP in years 51.607 10.805 25 86 24066
GP age less than 46 years 0.307 0.461 0 1 24172
GP age 46 to 59 years 0.464 0.499 0 1 24172
GP age 60 years & more 0.229 0.42 0 1 24172
GP female 0.273 0.446 0 1 24172
Practice SEIFA 5.922 3.218 1 11 23950
Graduated in Australia 0.727 0.445 0 1 24172
Graduated in OECD country 0.115 0.319 0 1 24155
Graduated in non OECD country 0.157 0.364 0 1 24155
Fellow of RACGP 0.332 0.471 0 1 24054
Inner region 0.204 0.403 0 1 24155
Large cities 0.665 0.472 0 1 24155
Outer region 0.131 0.337 0 1 24155
GP: solo 0.173 0.378 0 1 23962
GP: 2 to 4 0.394 0.489 0 1 23962
GP: 5 and more 0.434 0.496 0 1 23962
NSW 0.371 0.483 0 1 24155
ACT 0.012 0.108 0 1 24155
NT 0.013 0.113 0 1 24155
QLD 0.167 0.373 0 1 24155
SA 0.086 0.281 0 1 24155
TAS 0.026 0.16 0 1 24155
VIC 0.241 0.428 0 1 24155
WA 0.083 0.276 0 1 24155
Year 2002/2003 0.112 0.315 0 1 24172
Year 2003/2004 0.12 0.325 0 1 24172
Year 2004/2005 0.111 0.314 0 1 24172
Year 2005/2006 0.129 0.335 0 1 24172
Year 2006/2007 0.12 0.325 0 1 24172
Age 1-14 0.004 0.065 0 1 24172
Age 15-24 0.01 0.099 0 1 24172
Age 25-44 0.081 0.274 0 1 24172
Age 45-64 0.384 0.486 0 1 24172
Age 65-74 0.28 0.449 0 1 24172
Age 75 plus 0.24 0.427 0 1 24172
Patient female 0.491 0.5 0 1 24172
ATSI 0.031 0.173 0 1 24172
Non-English speaking 0.151 0.358 0 1 23265
Diabetes type 1 0.088 0.283 0 1 24172
Diabetes type 2 0.913 0.282 0 1 24172
Health care card 0.73 0.444 0 1 21107
Number of other problems 1.307 0.961 0 3 24172
Division asthma program 0.884 0.175 0 1 24152
Number of SIP services provided 189.61 135.667 13 671.778 24099
Ratio Division staff per practice 0.181 0.148 0.036 1.162 24152
Number of GPs active in Division 98.722 67.091 6.571 293.2 24152
Percentage of female GPs within Division 0.314 0.099 0.031 0.651 24152
Percentage of solo practices within Division 0.398 0.135 0.05 0.733 24152
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Table IV. Full results: pooled and trivariate probit
Pooled probit Trivariate probit
HbA1c PIP status HbA1c GP size
GP age less than 46 years 0.111 0.061 0.071 0.342
(0.035)*** (0.077) (0.045) (0.063)***
GP age 60 years & more -0.194 -0.280 -0.122 -0.312
(0.043)*** (0.091)*** (0.053)** (0.072)***
Sessions worked p week 0.030 -0.119 0.047 0.001
(0.038) (0.062)* (0.040) (0.065)
GP female 0.009 0.037 0.008 -0.081
(0.008) (0.014)** (0.011) (0.014)***
PRSEIFA 0.152 0.022 0.000 0.014
(0.039)*** (0.010)** (0.006) (0.010)
Inner region 0.194 0.419 0.042 -0.006
(0.050)*** (0.088)*** (0.054) (0.080)
Outer region 0.004 0.456 0.100 -0.447
(0.005) (0.118)*** (0.074) (0.107)***
Graduated in OECD country -0.053 0.027 -0.048 -0.068
(0.045) (0.084) (0.045) (0.085)
Graduated in NON OECD country -0.185 0.033 -0.165 -0.293
(0.050)*** (0.085) (0.056)*** (0.080)***
Large practice 0.017 1.550 -0.052
(0.032) (0.234)*** (0.240)
ACT 0.129 -0.363 0.155 0.114
(0.124) (0.206)* (0.137) (0.207)
NT 0.171 -0.332 0.221 0.036
(0.172) (0.328) (0.177) (0.271)
QLD 0.035 0.304 -0.031 0.005
(0.042) (0.082)*** (0.048) (0.087)
SA -0.042 0.280 -0.117 0.348
(0.056) (0.121)** (0.068)* (0.111)***
TAS -0.266 0.213 -0.301 0.134
(0.136)* (0.162) (0.137)** (0.158)
VIC -0.034 0.074 -0.089 0.160
(0.043) (0.085) (0.051)* (0.085)*
WA -0.007 -0.085 -0.038 0.112
(0.057) (0.100) (0.061) (0.111)
Year 2003/2004 0.059 0.153 0.026 0.123
(0.050) (0.088)* (0.053) (0.086)
Year 2004/2005 0.059 0.283 0.000 0.176
(0.048) (0.094)*** (0.053) (0.087)**
Year 2005/2006 0.090 0.550 -0.012 0.145
(0.048)* (0.099)*** (0.060) (0.087)*
Year 2006 0.113 0.685 -0.022 0.197
(0.049)** (0.106)*** (0.067) (0.085)**
Age-group 1 to 14 -0.288 0.064 -0.291 0.130
(0.261) (0.239) (0.260) (0.205)
Age-group 15 to 24 0.147 -0.221 0.168 -0.051
(0.125) (0.140) (0.125) (0.128)
Age-group 25 to 44 0.094 -0.199 0.118 0.043
(0.051)* (0.054)*** (0.052)** (0.054)
Age-group 45 to 64 0.043 -0.082 0.054 0.001
(0.031) (0.033)** (0.031)* (0.033)
Age-group 75 plus -0.084 -0.051 -0.075 0.001
(0.034)** (0.036) (0.034)** (0.034)
Patient female -0.016 -0.009 -0.016 0.009
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
ATSI -0.166 -0.382 -0.089 -0.079
(0.073)** (0.156)** (0.077) (0.162)
Non-English background -0.065 -0.117 -0.021 -0.227
(0.043) (0.068)* (0.046) (0.062)***
Type 1 Diabetes -0.343 -0.032 -0.337 0.059
(0.050)*** (0.049) (0.051)*** (0.050)
Health care c -0.127 -0.065 -0.113 -0.012
(0.029)*** (0.034)* (0.029)*** (0.034)
Other problems 0.046 0.033 0.040 -0.004
(0.014)*** (0.017)* (0.014)*** (0.017)
Constant -0.841 -2.031 -0.872 0.685
(0.102)*** (0.244)*** (0.171)*** (0.261)***
Table IV reports the coefficients of all control variables used in each equation of the trivariate
probit model. * 10 %, ** 5 % , *** 1 % significance level.
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Table V. Validity test of instruments
Eqs. PIP status & HbA1c test Eqs. GP size & HbA1c test
Single instrument in PIP eq.: Single instrument in GP size eq.:
asthma SIPservice StaffPrac nGPs nGPs soloGPs femGPs
p-value of joint H0: all other instruments are jointly insign in HbA1c eq.
.331 .330 .808 .373 .542 .642 .584
p-value of single instrument in PIP/GP size eq.
.052 .626 .001 .015 .001 .000 .012
p-value of treatment effect
.046 .068 .003 .056 .411 .400 .409
Table V reports the p-values for testing the hypothesis that the three (two) of the four (three)
instruments used in the PIP status (GP size) equation are jointly not statistically significant in
the HbA1c equation, while the remaining instrument is used to identify the PIP status (GP size)
equation. The p-value of the test that the single remaining instrument is statistically not significant
in the PIP status (GP size) equation is reported in the second line. The p-value of the hypothesis
that the treatment effect is not statistically significant under these scenarios is reported in the third
line.
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